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Missing Shakespeare’s Law: Some Writing about Some Reading about Close Reading   KAREN CUNNINGHAM   
  
his paper begins with a question: how is it that literary scholarship on law 
in Shakespeare historically figured so little in close readings of the plays? 
Presently there is a proliferation of work on all aspects of the relationships 
between Shakespeare and the wide swath of legal history. Yet older and 
newer editions of the plays adopt the view that Shakespeare’s pervasive references 
to contemporary legal language and questions do not bear importantly on his 
achievements. When aspects of law do appear in literary readings, they are often 
assimilated into the broad category “political background,” obscured via a 
marginalizing intellectual osmosis. In these views, instead of being the story itself, 
legal Shakespeare is a small element in a larger more significant tale. Indeed, in 
virtually all editions there is ample talk about religious thought but none about 
legal thought, yet the latter touched the everyday life of English persons as 
profoundly as did the former.1 More than this, the language of law touches the 
Shakespearean text with surprising regularity. How is it that this everyday aspect 
of being and this pervasive aspect of Shakespearean language remained marginal 
in readings?  
 Put differently, my problem is my curiosity about something that did not 
happen: the regular inclusion of legal awareness in close readings of Shakespeare’s 
works. To explore this idea, I want here first to trace a partial (in both senses) 
history of some theoretical and ideological underpinnings of close reading (for 
which I’m going to lean heavily on Terry Eagleton), then to consider the more 
recent “law and literature” movement. Over time, the separation of law, with all 
its complexity about human relationships, from literature in general and 
Shakespeare in particular, produces characteristics of both the literary and the legal 
disciplines: a particular version of Shakespeare as a playwright interested only in 
“these” kinds of things (religion, etc.) and not in “those” kinds of things (law), and 
a version of law as a marginal or “other” collation of ideas unrelated to popular 
culture and humanist thought. In short, as literature is separated from the concerns 
of everyday society, law is separated from the humanities and concomitantly from 
its humanity. 
 The Shakespearean imaginary itself resists this idea that persons are 
separable from legal language, processes, and culture. The law’s elusive ways of 
being, for example, are captured in Measure for Measure: law might be only a 
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“scarecrow,” an inanimate semblance of a person, a feigned human presence 
designed to frighten trespassers into submission and to make them believe in its 
threatening powers; or law (which “hath not been dead, though it hath slept”) 
might be a gifted person, “like a prophet” reawakened to foresee and prevent 
future evils; or it may be that law is an autocratic ruler, a “tyrant” whose extreme 
and abusive use of authority justifies resistance and rebellion. All of these examples 
make evident that in Shakespeare’s works “law” refuses to settle into a tidy 
collection of codes to be enforced or procedures to be followed. Instead, in order 
to think about the legal, Shakespeare in these instances adopts the language of 
personification, and the language itself figures the inseparability of the relationship 




One History of Close Reading 
 
In “The Rise of English,” Terry Eagleton offers a useful overview of the practical 
and ideological roots of “literature” and what has become known as close reading. 
In eighteenth-century England the idea of literature meant the whole body of 
writing valued in society. Though this writing “embodied the values and tastes of 
a particular social class” only, it nonetheless included history, political essays, 
philosophy, letters, and so on.2 Under Romanticism, however, from which our 
own idea of “literature” develops, the category narrows to creative or imaginative 
work, and poetry comes to be associated with a concept of human creativity at 
odds with the utilitarian ideology of early industrial capitalist England: “to write 
about what did not exist was somehow more soul stirring” than to pen accounts 
of history, society, science.3 Offering an alternative to and detachment from 
history, the theories of the Romantics stressed the “sovereignty and autonomy of 
the imagination, its splendid remoteness from the merely prosaic matters of 
feeding one’s children or struggling for political justice.”4  
The names of those who to a greater or lesser extent adopted this idea of 
literature as a counter to the realities of life in society will be familiar to students 
of close reading: F. R. Leavis, I. A. Richards, William Empson, and L.C. Knights 
embraced the idea that literature was a vehicle for reshaping and saving English 
society—a view ironized by one pundit’s comment that “The Decline of the West 
was felt to be averted by close reading.”5 A recurring motif of this view was that 
those (of a certain sex and class) who learned to read literature according to certain 
principles were of superior morality. (Eagleton is quick to point out that soon 
Leavis and his followers were faced with the realization that “all those who could 
not recognize enjambement [sic] were not nasty and brutish, and not all who could 
were morally pure”.6) 
Under the designation “practical criticism,” Leavis and his colleagues 
pioneered a mode of reading that was unafraid to take a text apart, but they also 
propagated the idea that literary “greatness” and “centrality” could be judged only 
by focusing attention on poems or pieces of prose removed from their cultural 
and historical contexts. Hence, “close reading.” (This kind of thinking comes, of 
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course, with interpretive and social consequences: the cost of establishing 
literature as different from other kinds of writing is the uprooting of literary texts 
from critical aspects of daily life including legal contexts.) Eagleton offers the 
following description: 
 
Like “practical criticism” [“close reading”] meant detailed 
analytic interpretation, providing a valuable antidote to 
aestheticist chit-chat; but it also seemed to imply that every 
previous school of criticism had read only an average of 
three words per line. To call for close reading, in fact, is to 
do more than insist on due attentiveness to the text. It 
inescapably suggests an attention to this rather than to 
something else: to the “words on the page” rather than to 
the contexts which produced and surrounded them. It 
implies a limiting as well as a focusing of concern—a 
limiting badly needed by literary talk which would ramble 
comfortably from the text of Tennyson’s language to the 
length of his beard. But in dispelling such anecdotal 
irrelevancies, “close reading” also held at bay a good deal 
else: it encouraged the illusion that any piece of language, 
“literary” or not, can be adequately studied or even 
understood in isolation. It was the beginnings of the 
“reification” of the literary work, the treatment of it as an 
object in itself, which was to be triumphantly consummated 
in the American New Criticism.7 
 
Promulgating the idea that “poetry is an ‘emotive’ rather than a ‘referential’ 
language,” I. A. Richards and the American New Critics isolated human feelings 
about the world in poetry.8 Focusing on ambiguity, paradox, irony, and the effects 
of connotation and figurative language, American New Criticism flourished from 
the 1930’s to the 1950’s, discovering in literature an “aesthetic alternative” to the 
perceived sterility of the scientific rationalism of industrial America.9 
 From the late twentieth century to the present, new modes of analysis 
developed in response to feminism, queer theory, New Historicism, and gender 
and cultural studies. Initially these approaches adopted the conventions of close 
reading, but as they became more dominant, close reading became less prominent 
in these modes of inquiry. Pointing to “[t]he introduction to an influential 
American volume, Cultural Studies, [which] declares ‘although there is no 
prohibition against close textual readings in cultural studies, they are also not 
required,’” Jonathan Culler notes one consequence of the sidelining of close 
reading: “freed from the principle . . . that the main point of interest is the 
distinctive complexity of individual works,” cultural studies could treat works as 
instances or symptoms of something else.10 The perceived dominance of cultural 
studies has prompted resistance, sometimes in language that revives Leavisite 
aspirations. At the 2016 Shakespeare World Congress, a panel entitled 
“Shakespeare in Zoom” offered this description: “Recent scholarship shows 
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renewed interest in excavating the coherence and complexity of literature before 
attempting political advocacy or diagnosing social symptomology. Through very 
close reading of page and stage, this panel will be ‘Recreating Shakespeare’ as if by 
cloning, zooming in on patterns of details that give his words life.”11 Though the 
description adopted the futuristic language of “cloning” and optical terminology 
of modern film criticism in “zooming,” the metaphors sit uneasily with the 
nostalgia for “excavating the coherence” of literature and positioning that 
excavation “before” “attempts” at other readings—here broadly categorized as 
“political advocacy” or diagnoses of “social symptomology.” 
It is not inevitable, however, that close reading be severed from the 
contradictions and inequities of contemporary society or pursue “coherence.” In 
her recent “Shakespeare in Slow Motion,” Marjorie Garber refocuses the literary 
argument from the meanings of language to its operations: “The last several 
decades have seen sustained interest on the part of literary scholars in the contexts 
of Shakespeare’s plays, from political, social, religious, and cultural history to 
biography. . . . My objective in ‘Shakespeare in Slow Motion’ is to slow down the 
move to context, if not reverse it altogether, by redirecting attention to the 
language of the plays, scene by scene, act by act, moment by moment, word by 
word.”12 Though this may sound initially like a return to the past—another version 
of “the radical nature of close reading, achieved through the analytical rigor of 
attention to the philological or rhetorical devices of language” —Garber’s goal is 
to slow readers from slipping too hastily into the various usual kinds of 
explanations for linguistic events: the idea that the language reflects character flaws 
or intentions or generic conventions or audience effects.13 “Reading Shakespeare 
in slow motion resists the idea of determination by character and motive unless 
these elements can be described in a particular linguistic formation. Puzzles and 
loose ends remain as puzzles and loose ends. . . . Character and motive, in fact, are 
revealed or produced as critical fantasies—which is not at all the same as saying 
they do not exist.”14  Garber’s pedagogical experiment in “slow reading” resists 
the push toward “coherence” and internal equipoise: 
 
The point was not that reading in slow motion would 
disclose the singular truth but that many readings are not 
readings at all but prior identifications with meanings 
already there, a literary practice that projects an intention to 
mean. Whether such readings were historicist (based on a 
historical referent or cause), or generic (based on 
expectations of what a tragedy or a comedy was or should 
do) or characterological (making claims about personality 
and psychology and motive), or indeed whether they 
developed out of the sheer weight and preexistence of so 
much prior commentary on Shakespeare, each had a 
narrative to offer. Small details that seemed to interrupt or 
contradict the narrative could be, and often were, ignored 
or set aside.15 
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In a similar vein, Culler identifies “one thing that is crucial to the practice of close 
reading: a respect for the stubbornness of texts, which resist easy comprehension 
or description in terms of expected themes and motifs. . . . Close reading teaches 
an interest in the strangeness or distinctiveness of individual works and parts of 
works. . . . The work of close reading is not primarily to resolve difficulties but 
above all to describe them, to elucidate their source and implications.”16 For 
Garber and Culler, a text’s “stubbornness,” its resistance to “coherence,” its 
comfort interrupting preexistent ideas, are not to be ignored or effaced but 
embraced. This view allows us to see that precisely because they are “stubborn” 
and “strange,” because they lie outside an expected narrative, legal language, 
thought, and action in Shakespeare have (until relatively recently) gone largely 




 A Legal Story 
 
 The connections between Shakespeare and legal thought are not new but deep 
and longstanding, reaching back to our earliest knowledge of his life and the 
performances and publications of his plays and poems. Yet it was only in the later 
nineteenth century, as biographers produced versions of “Shakespeare the author” 
and lawyers sought to foreground the humanistic basis of legal education, that 
these connections began to become prominent in literary studies. In the late 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the divide between legal and theatrical 
professions was neither clear nor firm; both the theatrical and legal disciplines in 
England were continuously establishing their own professional procedures, modes 
of thought, and boundaries. The Inns of Court were also the training grounds for 
writing of all kinds. Much of the legal literature was produced at the Inns, and in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries an impressive number of well-known 
writers passed through them, including More, Ascham, Gascoigne, Sackville and 
Norton, Ralegh, Donne, Bacon, Marston, Ford, Beaumont, and Congreve, among 
others.17 Innsmen acted in revels, and professional players performed at the Inns. 
Public interest in legal activities spilled out of the court centers to local taverns, 
where specialists and amateurs alike could debate “table-cases.” This easy 
circulation of law-related ideas into drama is evident in Dick the Butcher’s 
infamous cry of rebellion in the second part of Henry VI, “the first thing we do, 
let’s kill all the lawyers” (4.2.73), in Hamlet’s satirical conversation with a lawyer’s 
skull about legal quiddities (5.1.93ff.), in the trial scene in The Merchant of Venice 
(4.1), and in the sustained legal plot of Measure for Measure.18 Although later 
centuries saw the progressive separation of legal and literary studies from each 
other into their own fields, Shakespeare continued to draw legal minds. Yet one 
of the less-remarked aspects of the connection between lawyers and the playwright 
is that at least seven collections published throughout the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries—including Englishman Nicholas Rowe’s critical edition in 
1709, Irishman Edward Malone’s editions of the poems in 1780 and the plays in 
1790, and American H. H. Furness’s New Variorum edition in 1871—were by 
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men with legal backgrounds.19 Awareness of this editorial pattern allows us to see 
that there was a moment in legal and Shakespearean history when the two 
disciplines were seen not only as compatible but also as potentially integral to each 
other. In contrast, the erasure of this editorial history obscures the extent to which 
thinking about legal issues may have entailed thinking about literature in general 
and Shakespeare in particular, when law and the humanities were considered 
essential to each other; it clouds over the extent to which eighteenth and 
nineteenth-century editions may tilt toward the interests of lawyers; and it blurs 
the extent to which Shakespearean texts may have been treated as competitive 
proving grounds among lawyers and literary scholars—all of which perpetuate the 
severing of the legal from the literary disciplines.  
In light of this legally-informed editorial history (and in light of the 
historical aims of “practical” criticism to remove literature from its historical and 
cultural contexts), it is perhaps not surprising that much of the impetus behind the 
modern Shakespeare and law movement originated not among literary scholars 
but among lawyers. Its roots are not political but biographical, resting on the long-
standing and continuing question about authorship: could the young, ill-educated 
man from Stratford-on-Avon have written so knowledgably about law?  
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, scholars scoured the 
frequency of Shakespeare’s legal terms, evaluated whether they were used 
correctly, and argued about whether the author had been or had not been a law 
clerk. The debate was muted (though not silenced) in the early twentieth century 
by Paul Clarkson and Clyde Warren, both attorneys, who conclude in The Law of 
Property in Shakespeare and Elizabethan Drama that “what law there is in Shakespeare 
can, indeed must, be explained upon some grounds other than that he was a 
lawyer, or an apprentice, or a student of the law.”20  
At the same time that theories of Shakespearean authorship were being 
founded on instances of legal language, new concerns were arising among legal 
scholars about the objectivity of the law—and about the value of that objectivity 
if it did exist. Modern law was supposed to strive to be “impartial,” to adopt a key 
term from Duke Solinus in The Comedy of Errors. But did that ostensible impartiality 
always result in a fair or just verdict? Did a strict formalism allow law to function 
most effectively? Was the best law the least human (or humane) law? Pioneers of 
what has come to be known as the law-and-literature movement, two American 
jurists, John Wigmore (b. 1863) and Benjamin Cardozo (b. 1870), both of whom 
were practicing lawyers, argued that legal education and practice were too far 
removed from their human side; both believed that poetry and fiction should be 
incorporated into the law school curriculum in order to rehumanize the law. The 
result was the law-and-literature movement, which falls into two broad (and not 
wholly distinct) categories: law in literature and law as literature. Law in literature 
assumes that the study of great literary works can give insight into the nature of 
law and its effects on people; it looks at how legal situations and issues are 
presented in literature. Law as literature brings to bear the tools and theories of 
modern literary criticism for textual analysis in order better to understand not only 
the linguistic but also the textual basis of law, its narrative, rhetorical, and 
interpretive practices. One of the movement’s foundational books, James Boyd 
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White’s The Legal Imagination, 1973, adopts a humanist approach as it sets out to 
“look at the literature of the law as a literature of the imagination.” White asks 
readers to “see what the lawyer does as a literary activity, an enterprise of the 
imagination” with the goal not of reaching conclusions but of defining 
responsibilities.21 In chapters that combine explanations of legal topics, excerpts 
from legal theories and cases, and excerpts from literature, White embraces 
authors from Mathew Arnold to William Carlos Williams, and includes 
Shakespeare’s Antony and Cleopatra, Macbeth, Richard II, Richard III, Romeo and Juliet, 
The Tempest, The Winter’s Tale, sonnet 29, “When in disgrace with fortune and men’s 
eyes,” as well as a little Roger Ascham and Raphael Holinshed along the way.  
How better to (re)humanize law than to demonstrate its need for and 
treatment in the most prominent figure in the humanities? It would be an error to 
assume that only Shakespeare is part of that pedagogy; a brief survey shows that 
many authors—including Kafka, Dostoyevsky, and Dickens—make their way 
onto the syllabi of many current “literature and law” courses in law schools and in 
English departments. But Shakespeare enjoys a unique status in the English-
speaking world, having been credited by some academics as having “invented the 
human,” by others as having “invented poetic subjectivity,” and by others outside 
of academia as “the greatest writer in the English language—the writer from 
whose work our entire literary culture flows.”22 “To engage with literature is 
necessarily to encounter Shakespeare.”23 Whether or not one agrees with these 
attributions of origins (and many have pointed out problems with such 
idealizations), they remind us of the cultural power of saying “Shakespeare” in 
connection with almost any social or political concern. Yet what has remained less 





Speaking Law in Shakespeare 
 
Whatever is happening in literary and legal culture is happening in and through 
language, written and spoken, and I want to conclude by gesturing quite briefly to 
some instances and implications of legal language in Shakespeare. Although it may 
today seem obvious, simply recognizing the diffuse presence of legal language was 
a crucial early step in developing the nascent field of Shakespeare and law. If 
initially law-related terminology went unrecognized in academic scholarship, when 
it was visible, scholars troubled over the basis of choosing which terms to include 
among the “legal.” Clarkson and Warren, for example, dismiss the relevance of 
words they consider to be primarily figurative; if the usage is “metaphorical” or 
“general,” the language is considered “of little importance” to their project, a view 
that not only suppresses Shakespeare’s multivalent use of language, but also 
reiterates the idea that legal language was specifically not metaphorical.24 
Nonetheless, this new awareness of law’s pervasive linguistic presence in the 
Shakespeare canon opened the possibly of glosses appearing in editions and brief 
legal commentaries emerging in interpretations. This kind of study culminates in 
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B.J. and Mary Sokol’s comprehensive Shakespeare and Legal Language, an invaluable 
work that both demonstrates the extensiveness of legal terms and references, and 
supports the authors’ discovery that the playwright’s language “in effect produced 
an outline of English law and its institutions in Shakespeare’s age: the courts; law 
officers; the laws of property, inheritance, marriage, status; contract and debt, 
crime, misdemeanor, and regulation of morals.”25 
Although early studies took legal language in Shakespeare’s works as an 
explanation of other things—in particular, the author’s knowledge of law—more 
than as the revelation of a particular character or play, even in this restricted 
context, Shakespeare’s artistic intervention was evident. Myriad invocations 
throughout the canon of the language of property in all its facets—contracts, wills, 
inventories, possession, use, tenancy—not only situate characters imaginatively 
and emotionally within various courts and jurisdictions, but also establish legal 
language as the coin of the Shakespearean realm. Falstaff’s pun on escheat (the 
return of land upon the death of the tenant to the lord from whom it was held) in 
The Merry Wives of Windsor, as he anticipates deceiving Mistresses Page and Ford, 
for example, signifies both legal knowledge and poetic creativity: “I will be cheaters 
to them both, and they shall be exchequers to me” (1.3.70). New connotations of 
the term escheators were developing in early modern English popular culture, such 
that the public was beginning to associate escheators with informers. In an act of 
poetic appropriation, Shakespeare shortens the term to cheaters, apparently the first 
use of the term in English.26  (See also Henry IV, Part II, 2.4.110-111, and sonnet 
151, “Love is too young to know what conscience is.”) Shakespeare’s legal 
imagination is not restricted, of course, to local linguistic events. As the language 
of the plays invokes legal points, it simultaneously invokes their larger social 
significance: in this relationship, in this fictional society, in this play, what counts as 
justice? Play after play troubles over what might constitute an equitable response 
to a plea like Isabella’s: “Justice, O royal Duke! . . . // . . . justice. Justice! Justice! 
Justice!” (Measure for Measure, 5.1.20-25).  
Thinking with Shakespeare about law and close reading comes with a 
certain historical irony. During the “culture wars” of the 1990’s in the American 
academy, as many English departments recast their curricula, courses in individual 
authors often were replaced with wider period offerings. One result was the 
elimination of requirements that undergraduates take at least one course in 
Shakespeare. At the same time, Shakespeare and law studies were exploding with 
all kinds of work that would make it evident that the Shakespeare canon is a 
foundational archive in law and literature studies. One unanticipated result of the 
law’s habit of recruiting Shakespeare to recreate itself has been the exposure of the 
law’s extensive dependency on the arts of poesis of all sorts—and on Shakespeare’s 
in particular. Certainly these studies demonstrate that the Shakespeare canon is 
not supplemental nor incidental to the law, but essential to it. More than this, 
however, detailed, provocative studies are also persuasively demonstrating that the 
playwright’s works do not merely reflect legal culture, but take a central role in 
producing that culture in a distinctly Shakespearean way, bringing to light new and 
crucial insights into the role of the canon not only as a repository for early modern 
law but as a textual necessity for our continuous reimagining of a just society.  
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